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Explanations of states’ security decisions prioritise structural — systemic, institutional
and cultural — constraints that characterise foreign security decisions as a function of
external/international, domestic/institutional, or normative/cultural factors. By examining
Turkey’s 1990–1991 and 2003 Iraq war decisions systematically, we problematise this
prioritisation of structure, and we investigate the dynamic relationship between structural
constraints and leaders in their decision-making environments. In these cases, while the
structural constraints remain constant or indeterminate, the decision outcomes and the
decision-making process differ signiﬁcantly. Our ﬁndings, based on structured-focused
comparison, process tracing, and leadership trait analysis, suggest that the leaders’ per-
sonalities and how they react to constraints account for this difference and that depen-
dence on only one set of factors leads to an incomplete understanding of security policies
and international politics. We contribute to the broader understanding of leaders’ person-
alities by suggesting that self-conﬁdence and cognitive complexity are the key traits
distinguishing leaders’ orientations towards structural constraints.
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In 1990–1991 and 2003, Turkey faced critical foreign policy choices concerning its
neighbour, Iraq. In both cases, Turkey was pressured by the United States to support
the US-led military action against Iraq. This pressure accompanied by promises of
economic rewards from an important ally had to be balanced with concerns of
instability that the military interventions would create — instability both across and
within Turkish borders. In the ﬁrst Gulf War, president Turgut Özal steered Turkey
through controversial decisions, including the closing of the Turkish-Iraqi oil
pipeline and the deployment of the US troops in Turkey. In the second Gulf War,
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Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, upon assuming power as prime minister during the decision-
making process, was faced with questions of whether or not Turkey would allow the
stationing of the US troops on its soil and grant over-ﬂight rights. Both leaders
supported cooperation with the US requests, but faced signiﬁcant domestic opposition.
Özal dominated the decision making in the ﬁrst Gulf War, even though he had no
speciﬁc constitutional authority to do so, and he engineered Turkish cooperation with
the US-led military offensive against Iraq. Erdoğan, on the other hand, delegated
authority and bungled a parliamentary vote that resulted in the rejection to the
stationing of the US troops and the preclusion of a Northern front in the invasion of
Iraq. Both episodes were signiﬁcant junctures in the Turkish-US relations.
In this study, we argue that foreign policymaking involves a dynamic relationship
between political leadership as agency and the international, institutional and cultural
constraints as structure. Throughout, we use the term ‘structure’ as the context in
which action takes place; it not only limits but also shapes and propels behaviour. By
‘agency’, we mean the role of humans in the decision-making process. We illustrate
the dynamic structure — agency interaction in the Turkish decision-making context
analysing the 1991 and 2003 Iraq war decisions. These cases are especially suitable
for the purpose of our argument because although structural constraints were similar
or indeterminate between Turkey’s Iraq war decisions, the processes and choices
were very different. This, we conclude, is indicative of the dynamic relationship
between agency and structure. Speciﬁcally, we see two leaders, Özal in the ﬁrst Iraq
war and Erdoğan in the second Iraq war, with very different orientations towards
structural constraints. These different orientations stem from certain personality
traits, which inﬂuence both the process and the outcome of these critical decision-
making episodes in Turkey’s foreign policy.
International and domestic structural explanations in security policy
Structural explanations of security decisions, at both the international/systemic and
the internal/domestic levels, are familiar to all students of international politics
(Mintz and DeRouen 2010). From a neo-realist focus on anarchy and distribution of
power (e.g. Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1983) to liberalism’s expectations on the constraining
factors of economic interdependent structures and international regimes (e.g.
Keohane and Nye 1977; Krasner 1983), security policy is seen as a product of
international pressures faced by states and their leaders. System-level constructivism
also focuses on role structures (e.g. Wendt 1999) and normative structures (e.g.
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) to explain state behaviour according to the logics of
appropriateness and constructed expectations of self and other.
Other constructivists look inside the state at the domestic/societal level and point
to cultural norms and values, operating as structures of constraint on leaders and
foreign policy (e.g. Berger 1998). Similarly, the cultural explanation of democratic
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peace focuses on societal norms and values that encourage peaceful means of
conﬂict resolution when democratic states are dealing with other democracies who
hold similar liberal values (Owen 1994). The institutional explanation of demo-
cratic peace stresses the role of institutional structures and the constitutional checks
and balances that tie the hands of leaders through accountability to a more peaceful
public (Russett 1993). Both rational choice theories of domestic costs (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003) and neo-classical realism’s conception of the executive who
must bargain with domestic political actors to extract resources in order to respond
to international pressures (Lobell et al. 2009) also see political-domestic structures
as limits on security policy.
Other institutional factors can constrain leaders. Government structures that create
multi-party coalitions, for example, put multiple actors, or ‘veto-players’, in control
of state policy. Multi-party governments can bog down decision making and create
fragmented policy and excessive compromises; coalition governments may be more
vulnerable to junior party inﬂuence and inter-party politics (e.g. Palmer et al. 2004;
Özkeçeci-Taner 2005, 2009; Kaarbo 2012). In addition, decision-making rules, legal
provisions as provided by the constitution (i.e. which decisions need to be made or
approved by the parliament), different institutional arrangements that lead to the
formation of different decision units, the relationship between the executive and the
legislature, as well as within party disagreements can create further structural
constraints on foreign policymaking.
Many of these issues become particularly complicated when the executive cannot
make a decision such as ‘declaration of war’ or ‘sending troops abroad’ by itself or
without the approval of the parliament (Hänggi 2004). In this regard, certain legal
provisions, parliamentary opposition, and inter/intra-party factionalisation may limit
the ease and speed of decision-making processes in both single and multi-party
cabinets. Prime ministers (or cabinets) try to avoid taking an issue to the parliament if
there is a chance that the bill, or the government, would be challenged by opposition
parties or party backbenchers in the parliament. Similarly, they may simply wait until
it becomes possible for them to promote consensus-based policies (LeBlang and
Chan 2003; Wagner 2006).
Overall, many approaches to security policy emphasise the constraints imposed on
political leaders by various structural forces. This literature underemphasises the role
of the political leadership and does not examine how different leaders view national
goals, interpret international, institutional and cultural constraints, or how they try to
achieve their foreign policy objectives. Some leaders may indeed challenge structural
constraints or be less open to incoming information in order to maintain their
positions and divert attention from more disturbing issues (Hermann and Kegley
1995). In sum, leaders are not determined by structures, but instead interact
with them as security policies are made. Although importance of both the context
of structural constraints and the characteristics of leaders has been recognised
(e.g. Giddens 1984; Dessler 1989; Carlsnaes 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003;
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Chiozza and Goemans 2011), research is still largely silent on the question of how
structural constraints are shaped and interpreted by leaders and whether or not all
agents are equally constrained or empowered by structures. We agree that ‘a major
impediment to the development of adequate explanation and prediction in the study
of international relations and foreign policy is the failure by many academics in the
ﬁeld to treat seriously the role of psychology factors in individual decision making
and intergroup relations’ (Goldgeier 1997: 137).
Leaders’ orientations towards structural constraints
Decision makers are the central agents in the foreign policy-making process.
Presidents and prime ministers are the leaders (in democratic states) that face
international and domestic structures that may constrain their actions and choices.
Yet, they also interpret, construct and shape these structures. Key to this relationship
is their orientation towards constraints: leaders vary in how they respond to their
environments. Some confront structural barriers and pressures; others defer to or
work within them. Leaders’ orientations to structures are based on key personality
differences.
Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is one of the most prominent approaches to the
study of political leaders. This framework, developed by Hermann, integrates
decades of her research on the role of personality characteristics in foreign policy
(e.g. Hermann 1980, 1984, 1987, 2003). In this approach, personality is conceptua-
lised as a combination of seven traits: belief in ability to control events, conceptual
complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-conﬁdence, and
task orientation. LTA has been used to study the personalities of many leaders,
including the US presidents, British prime ministers, sub-Saharan African leaders,
and heads of international organisations. This research suggests that these personality
traits indeed link systematically to leaders’ decision-making behaviours and foreign
policy choices.
The LTA framework is particularly useful for investigating the Turkish leaders’
reaction in the Iraq wars. The framework conceptualises speciﬁcally how leaders
differ in their reaction to structural constraints. Unlike other approaches (e.g.
operational code research), LTA captures leaders’ styles of interacting with others,
rather than the content of leaders’ beliefs. According to Hermann, an LTA-based
personality proﬁle links systematically to a leader’s propensity to challenge or
respect constraints in their environments, their openness to information and advice,
the structure of their advisory systems, the quality of the decision-making process,
and the policies that leaders choose for their country or organisation. Previous
research supports these links (e.g. Hermann 2003; Kille and Scully 2003; Dyson
2006; Schafer and Crichlow 2010). Hermann (2003) suggests that the seven traits
combine in particular ways to produce speciﬁc behaviours. Leaders who have a high
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belief in their ability to control events and a high need for power, for example, are
expected to challenge constraints. Conceptual complexity and self-conﬁdence are
related to and predict leaders’ openness to information.
Thus, the advantage of using the LTA framework for investigating agent —
structure relations is that it provides speciﬁc expectations regarding which character-
istics of leaders matter and how. In other words, leaders with different traits are
expected to relate to their context, institutional setting, costs and beneﬁts of various
policy options, and other agents in theoretically meaningful and predictable ways.
Furthermore, the LTA approach provides a reliable, systematic, and comparative
method for assessing agent characteristics.
Method of investigation: case studies and content analysis
We combine structured-focused case comparison (George and McKeown 1985;
Mahoney 2004) and process tracing (Checkel 2008; Bennett 2010) with at-a-
distance content analysis (Schafer and Walker 2006). With this mixed-method
approach, we situate personality proﬁles of political leaders in their context,
comparing the contexts in a structured-focused fashion, through in-depth process
tracing of decision making. We examine four speciﬁc cases; each case is an
occasion for decision, deﬁned as an instance to which a decision unit has to react
(Hermann et al. 2001). There are usually numerous occasions for decision as
governments respond to policy situations and this was true for Turkey in both Iraq
wars. For the purposes of this article, we identify two critical occasions for
decision for each time period and we analyse how political agents (leaders)
interacted with structures in a detailed tracing of the decision-making process. We
examine the cases speciﬁcally for similarities and differences in terms of the
operative structural constraints. These cases are ‘crucial in the strongest sense’
(Gerring 2007: 232) because they are very similar to each other with the exception
of leaders’ personalities that a comparative study of them will provide ‘the
strongest sort of evidence possible in a nonexperimental setting’ (Gerring 2007:
232) to conﬁrm or disconﬁrm our arguments regarding the dynamic relationship
between structural constraints and leaders in their decision-making environments.
Evidence for the comparative case studies comes from descriptive accounts of the
decision-making process written by journalists, diplomats, and other scholars and
from semi-structured interviews that we conducted in July and August 2013. The
primary agents for this analysis are Turgut Özal (for the ﬁrst Iraq war) and Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan (for the second Iraq war).
Özal was the Turkish prime minister (1983–1989) from the Motherland Party, and
then served as president (1989–1993). Erdoğan became the Turkish prime minister in
March 2003, in the middle of decision making regarding the Iraq war. He was,
however, head of the ruling Justice and Development Party throughout this period
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and his eventual assumption of the prime ministership was expected. These leaders
were certainly not alone in Turkish foreign policymaking, but they were central.
Prime ministers are typically regarded as one of the three actors in a ‘tripod’ that
directs Turkish foreign policy (Makovsky and Sayarı 2000). As the head of the party
that controls a majority (or the largest number of seats) in the parliament, the prime
minister has the constitutional authority to direct foreign policy through the cabinet
(the council of ministers) and is generally very inﬂuential in both processes and
outcomes (Makovsky and Sayarı 2000). The foreign ministry and the military are
also considered important actors in foreign policy. Compared with other democra-
cies, the Turkish military is much more active in governance, as it has intervened in
decisions and in the removal of civilian governments (Makovsky 1999). The main
institution through which the military has inﬂuenced policymaking is the Milli
Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK), Turkey’s ‘national security council’. Composed of military
and civilian members (including the president, prime minister, and foreign and
defence ministers), it serves as an advisory body in security-related matters.
The presidency in Turkey is typically viewed as a symbolic position and many
presidents have interpreted their role as one that is ‘above politics’. The 1982
constitution certainly strengthened the position of the president and made the powers
of the president, also with regard to the foreign policy domain, more important during
weak governments (Özcan 2008: 153); the president is considered to be the head of
the state, and therefore expected to represent the state, as opposed to the government.
This differentiation means that the president does not have to, nor is expected to, get
involved in party politics. Some presidents, however, have played a much more
activist role and Özal’s presidency in particular has prompted scholars to include the
president as a potentially important player in foreign affairs. Arguably, presidents
Süleyman Demirel and Abdullah Gül represent similar activism. In contrast, Ahmet
Necdet Sezer, the president before Gül, did not. The parliament is considered a
secondary actor in Turkish foreign policy, although Article 92 of the constitution
gives the parliament the authority for foreign troop deployment in Turkey and for
sending Turkish troops to other countries. Finally, Turkish leaders are accountable to
the public in democratic elections; however, elites are seen as having great capacity
for managing public pressures in the area of foreign policy (Makovsky and Sayarı
2000). In sum, president Özal and prime minister Erdoğan were key agents in the Iraq
decisions, although they faced other agents and structural constraints on their ability
to make Turkish foreign policy.1
The personality proﬁles of Özal and Erdoğan are based on the LTA content
analysis scheme. For the LTA coding, it is assumed that the more frequently leaders
use certain words and phrases when they speak, the more apparent and salient such
content is to them and the more it reﬂects underlying personality traits (Hermann
2003). Coding is quantitative and employs frequency counts taking the word or
phrase as the unit of analysis. LTA proﬁles are now produced with automated
machine-coding using ProﬁlerPlus, a language parsing software programme
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developed by Social Science Automation (SSA).2 The programme determines the
percentage of particular words and phrases used by the leaders based on the length of
the text.3 The percentages for any leader can be compared with those of 284 world
political leaders and a subset of 46 leaders from the Middle East. Through such
comparisons, it becomes possible to determine whether the particular leader is high,
low, or average on a trait (Hermann 2003). Our primary focus in this paper is
comparing the leadership traits of Özal with Erdoğan’s to understand the different
ways in which these leaders interacted with structures.
For this study, we conﬁned the text coded to the time period before the decisions
under investigation: for Özal, from 16 March, 1987 to 7 January, 1991; for Erdoğan,
from 28 August, 2001 to 9 March, 2003. Although this is a shorter time period for
Erdoğan, it was important to restrict this study to these periods because leaders’
styles may change over time (Hermann 2003) and it would be inappropriate to use
text spoken after the cases to capture Özal’s and Erdoğan’s personality traits. For
Özal, we analysed 44,346 words in 47 documents; for Erdoğan, 9,317 words in 33
documents, all drawn from interviews with domestic and international media as well
as from the leaders’ spontaneous statements at press brieﬁngs.4 The contents
analysed were limited to foreign policy issues. The content analysis was conducted
in English using ProﬁlerPlus, Version 5.8.4.
Although LTA and other at-a-distance assessments have become more reliable
with machine-coding, they continue to face a central question of validity: do the
words of leaders truly reﬂect their personal beliefs and personality characteristics?
This question revolves around authorship, audience effects and deception, temporal
stability, and language differences. In this study, we address these issues by using
only interviews and other spontaneous material and not prepared speeches. We
combine the texts across different audience types (i.e. domestic and international),
and assume that these leaders’ characteristics can be meaningfully assessed in
English (if the text was originally spoken in English) or in English translations. We
build on previous scholarship and assert that leaders do have some control over their
speech acts and that LTA can capture leaders’ public personalities (if not their private
ones), which matter more for explaining their decision-making style and foreign
policy choices.5 We also assess the validity of these proﬁles by pairing them with
case studies to see if the personality variables play out in the decision-making
processes in theoretically meaningful ways; if they do, we can have greater
conﬁdence that LTA is capturing what it purports to measure.
Turkey’s ﬁrst and second Iraq war decisions
The 1990–1991 Iraq war and occasions for decisions
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the UN Security Council convened
within hours and unanimously adopted Resolution 660, demanding that Iraq
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withdraw from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally, and negotiate through
peaceful means (Department of Public Information of the United Nations 1990: 167).
The United States also demanded reinstatement of the Kuwaiti government,
restoration of regional security and stability (Department of Defence 1992: 22). The
United Nations followed with mandatory sanctions on Iraq, a shipping blockade, and
an authorisation for member states to use all necessary means to end the Iraqi
invasion. When Iraq did not comply, the military intervention of the US-led alliance
began on 17 January, 1991. The war ended with the reinstatement of the Kuwaiti
regime and the withdrawal of Iraqi forces on 26 February, 1991.
Throughout the crisis, Turkey, a neighbour of Iraq with a Muslim majority, sided
with the United States. There were several important occasions for decision
confronting the Turkish leadership (Oğuz 2005). These included the questions of
(1) if the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline should be closed and economic sanctions
implemented; (2) if Turkish troops should be sent to join the coalition forces; (3) if
the coalition military forces should be allowed to use Turkish soil to launch attacks
on Iraq; and (4) if a second front should be opened via Turkey. Among these, the
decisions to close the oil pipeline and the deployment of the US troops to Turkey to
launch attacks across the Turkish-Iraqi border became the most pressing issues at the
time. On both occasions, president Turgut Özal was not the only person who had the
ability to commit the country’s resources and had to work with others. Yet, Özal was
very much involved in the decision-making process and acted as a prominent
political actor.
Closing of the oil pipeline
The Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline carried nearly half of Iraq’s oil (Hale 2000). The US
leadership requested Turkey to close the pipelines during the early days of the crisis.
Özal asked the US president Bush to get a UN Security Council resolution to that
effect. After the UN resolution was obtained on 6 August, 1990, an occasion for
decision was created for Turkish decision makers. The major issue was whether or
not the economic embargo should be implemented immediately and when the
pipeline should be closed. The latter was especially important because the closing
of the pipeline would be very costly for Turkey, albeit crucial for the successful
implementation of the UN sanctions on Iraq.
In the end, the Turkish leadership agreed to close the pipeline in accordance with
the Security Council resolution, but there was some disagreement between Özal and
others concerning the timing (Efegil 2002). Initially, it seemed as if Turkey was
going to adopt a wait-and-see approach and would not close the pipeline right away.
The ministry of foreign affairs and prime minister Yıldırım Akbulut (from the same
political party as Özal) stated that Turkey was not ready to impose economic
sanctions against Iraq and that Turkey should wait for Saudi Arabia’s reaction. If the
Saudis declined to close their pipelines, the embargo would not be effective
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(Bush’tan Özal’a: Boru Hattını Kapatın 1990). Others, including the Turkish Armed
Forces, suggested that Turkey would continue to ‘adhere to its previous policy of
remaining strictly aloof fromMiddle Eastern conﬂicts’ (Hale 2000: 220). While these
actors favoured a more cautious stance, president Özal’s personal and often secret
communications with president Bush continued.
The council of ministers meeting on 7 August, 1990, displayed the dominance of
Özal as he made his preference clear and declared that he had already taken the
relevant initiatives. Indeed, that very same day, Özal convened a small meeting with
the state minister for energy, Mehmet Keçeciler, and ordered him to declare the
pipeline closed (Oğuz 2005: 50–51). This announcement came as a surprise given
that the decision was made without the knowledge of some very important decision
makers, including the chief of staff Necip Torumtay, whose consent was required to
make such a decision. Özal used the meeting of the council of ministers strategically
and made the decision appear as if it were the government’s decision. On 8 August, it
was announced publicly that Turkey would suspend all commercial dealings with
Iraq and close the oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Yumurtalık.6 As later reports indicate,
Özal put pressure on cabinet ministers to agree with his initiatives, despite opposition
from the ministry of foreign affairs, opposition parties in the parliament, and the
military (Efegil 2002; Oran 2001).
Allowing the US-led forces deployment in Turkey
When the prospect of a military operation against Iraq became apparent, another
important occasion for decision emerged. Turkey hosted several US military bases on
its soil, and unlike the previous decision, this occasion for decision— whether or not
to allow the US-led forces in Turkey to be deployed — necessitated the approval of
the Turkish parliament. Article 92 of the Turkish constitution requires parliamentary
approval for foreign forces on Turkish soil for war purposes or for Turkish territory to
be used in a war situation. Interestingly, president Özal had already asked prime
minister Akbulut to take the issue to the parliament even before a request to deploy
military forces came from the United States. According to many, Özal was informed
about the US plans to use the bases in Turkey in advance and wanted to ensure
parliamentary approval before the issue became a divisive one within Turkey (Hale
2000; Efegil 2002).
The decision to bring the motion to the parliament created considerable disagree-
ment among the ruling Motherland Party, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the chief
of staff. The motion created tension because it was perceived as a war decision on a
country that did not attack Turkey and as giving a ‘green light’ for the utilisation of
the US bases in Turkey. However, similar to the ﬁrst occasion for decision, president
Özal was effective in using his inﬂuence over the prime minister and did not refrain
from publicly criticising those who were reluctant, such as the chief of staff and
military ofﬁcials, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the opponents in the Motherland
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Party. However, unlike the ﬁrst occasion, Özal could not act alone, given the
constitutional structural constraints.
The situation became more tense when the US secretary of state Baker, on his visit
to Ankara on 9 August, 1990, requested (1) the use of the US bases located in Turkey
for an air campaign in Northern Iraq, (2) the movement of Turkish troops to the
Turkish-Iraqi border to help deter Saddam Hussein from moving his troops to
Southern Iraq, and (3) the dispatch of a Turkish battalion to Saudi Arabia to join the
allied forces assembling there (Pertman 1990). Özal immediately authorised prime
minister Akbulut and the cabinet to get the necessary parliamentary approval. The
ofﬁce of the prime minister prepared a memorandum asking the parliament to grant
the government the power to send Turkish troops abroad and permit the stationing of
foreign troops in Turkey. The ministry of foreign affairs was once again left in the
dark. After intense parliamentary debates, a bill, which stated that the government
requested ‘permission’ (not ‘power’) to declare war only ‘in case of aggression
against our country’ was approved (Hale 2000).
Özal, ﬁnding the bill too restrictive and not operational, pushed further to persuade
members of the parliament to approve an ‘unconditional authorisation’ that would give
him control over the decision. He became personally involved, alongside the council of
ministers, in preparing a new memorandum, in which he asked for more power for the
government with regard to sending Turkish troops to foreign countries and allowing
foreign forces to be stationed in Turkey. Despite the rejection and/or abstinence of 30
members of the rulingMotherland Party during the vote on the motion on 5 September,
1990, parliament gave permission to the council of ministers to send Turkish troops
and to allow the stationing of foreign forces in Turkey. The limits and scope of such
actions were to be determined by the government even if Turkey was not attacked
(Oğuz 2005: 70; Journal of Proceedings of the Parliament [TBMM Tutanak Dergisi],
1 September 1990). Yet, the parliament rejected the government’s request for
permission to declare war (Hale 2000). Although the authoritative decision unit was
not president Özal on this occasion, he was still extremely inﬂuential in the decision
outcome and constantly challenged structural constraints.
The 2003 Iraq war and occasions for decisions
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration perceived the Iraqi
regime as a threat to the US security. Iraq was, allegedly, equipped with weapons of
mass destruction and, consequently, the US government began planning a military
operation in 2002. The operation began on 20 March, 2003.
The US preference to open a Northern front via Turkey in the Iraq war became an
important issue in Ankara in December 2002 and January 2003, only months after
the newly elected Justice and Development Party (‘Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’, AKP
hereafter) came to power. Although sympathetic to the US worries, the newly created
government was hesitant to support the US initiative directly as many Turks saw a
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possible invasion of Iraq by the United States as nothing more than an act of
aggression (Gözen 2005; Kapsis 2006). The US decision to invade Iraq, with or
without Turkish support, proved to be the ﬁrst major challenge for the new
government that was largely inexperienced and wanting to please both the US
government and the Turkish public. This would prove difﬁcult as approximately 90
per cent of the Turkish public opposed the US intervention, seeing it as unlawful and
unethical (Gözen 2005), and most Turks (86 per cent) were also against the stationing
of the US troops in Turkey for the invasion (Özdamar and Taydaş 2012). The anti-
war and anti-American sentiments among the Turkish population resulted from the
nature of the ongoing US-Turkish negotiations and how the United States treated
Turkey, as well as from Turkey’s experience during the ﬁrst Gulf War (Özdamar and
Taydaş 2012). Public opinion mattered more than usually during this period,
although it remained only one of the factors inﬂuencing Turkish leaders.
The rejection of the motion by the Turkish parliament on 1 March, 2003, is usually
considered to be the critical event in Turkey’s decision on the 2003 Iraq war. Yet, there
were four important occasions for decision. These included: (1) the February 6 motion:
if Turkey should authorise the United States to upgrade the US military bases in Turkey
in preparation for the impending war; (2) the March 1 motion: if Turkey should allow
the United States to station troops in Turkey as a base for a Northern front, (3) theMarch
20 motion: if the United States should be given over-ﬂight rights; and (4) the October 7
motion: if Turkey should send its own troops to Iraq (Yetkin 2004: 100).
Among these, we focus on the second and the third occasion for decision, as they
proved to be the most contentious. Although neither Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who
was not part of the cabinet during the initial stage due to legal constraints,7 nor
Abdullah Gül had ‘the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed’
(Hermann 2001: 48), both acted as prominent political actors on both occasions for
decision. Following by-elections, Erdoğan was elected to the parliament on 9 March
and he replaced Gül as prime minister on 14 March, 2003. Gül was appointed as the
minister of foreign affairs the same day. Although these changes took place as
negotiations about Turkey’s involvement in the Iraq war were underway, Erdoğan, as
head of the AKP and prime minister-to-be, was the leading ﬁgure from the very
beginning of the process. According to Taydaş and Özdamar, ‘Erdoğan acted as de
facto prime minister and led the Iraq war talks with the United States, even though he
had no formal powers. He tried to show the members of the party that he was, indeed,
in charge’ (2013: 234). The minister of foreign affairs during the time of the crisis,
Yaşar Yakış, also conﬁrmed that he and prime minister Gül consulted with Erdoğan
on highly critical decisions concerning the crisis.8
Deployment of the US troops in Turkey for a Northern front
The ﬁrst written request from Turkey was sent on 19 November, 2002, asking the
Turkish government to allow the US personnel who were permanently based in
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Turkey to prepare the US bases for use during the war. Both the military ofﬁcials and
the foreign ministry bureaucrats completed a detailed report strongly recommending
Turkey’s support to the US-led coalition before the gathering of the MGK on 31
January. They criticised the indecisive attitude of the government and insisted that it
should make a decision urgently (Yetkin 2004). Despite the MGK’s green light to
eventual participation in a military action against Iraq, the government refrained from
making a clear decision. Prime minister Gül hoped to prevent war by visiting
countries in the region and sending Turkish ofﬁcials to meet with Iraqi ofﬁcials to
persuade Saddam Hussein to comply with the sanctions regime (Yetkin 2004). This
was partly because he knew that he would have difﬁculty convincing his party
members to vote in favour of a motion supporting the US deployment and opening a
Northern front in the Iraq war (Yetkin 2004).
On 6 February, 2003, by a vote of 308 to 193, the Turkish parliament passed
Resolution 759, giving power to the government to open a number of Turkish bases
to the US specialists for war preparation. The motion represented the government’s
willingness to cooperate with the United States. Some parliamentarians adamantly
rejected the claim that this was a ‘blank check’ of support for the US-led coalition.
The government, however, was already in negotiations with the Bush administration
regarding Turkish involvement in the war. In these negotiations, Turkey set forth a
number of conditions for its involvement, including the deployment of defence
capabilities at its border with Iraq to manage any refugee ﬂow, the US economic aid
to compensate for losses from the war, and a partnership with the United States in
overseeing the distribution and recollection of sophisticated weapons to opposition
groups in Northern Iraq.
The Turkish government and the US ofﬁcials had an understanding that an
agreement was in the making. The negotiations regarding a deal were almost
concluded by the third week of February. Before a cabinet meeting on 24 February,
2003, foreign affairs minister Yaşar Yakış said that an agreement in principle, yet
unofﬁcial and not ﬁnal, was reached on the political and military conditions of the US
deployment, and only a few issues remained concerning the economic aid package.
Turkey was to be offered US$2 billion in aid and $24 billion in loan provision
(Bölükbaşı 2008). Turkey and the United States, however, were unable to reach a
ﬁnal agreement (Yetkin 2004).
Hesitant to put a motion to parliamentary vote and ask for delegation of power
from the parliament to allow the deployment of the US troops in Turkey and the
sending of Turkish troops to Iraq, especially without a written agreement, the AKP
government received more pressure from the United States, despite major disagree-
ments regarding the details of Turkey’s involvement within the Turkish leadership
(Yetkin 2004). Finally, the US administration asked the Turkish government to make
a decision within 48 hours.
This pressure intensiﬁed further the divisions among policymakers in Ankara.
Some cabinet ministers were in favour of the deployment of the US forces and
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Turkey’s involvement in the conﬂict, although others were opposed to them.
Although the MGK, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the Turkish Armed Forces
were generally pro-deployment, president Necdet Sezer, most of the deputies in the
parliament including the opposition parties, and the speaker of the parliament Bülent
Arınç (AKP) were against it (Yanatma 2008). The newly elected AKP government,
and especially Gül as temporary prime minister, were reluctant to take responsibility.
Gül wanted to diffuse accountability by emphasising that the military favoured direct
involvement (Yetkin 2003, 2004) and he sought public afﬁrmation from the military,
which could help the government share responsibility for a war decision. Tellingly,
before sending in the motion asking for deployment, the cabinet decided to wait until
the MGK meeting on 28 February, 2003, with the expectation of a strong
recommendation from the military. The military, on the other hand, was waiting for
a political decision and refrained from announcing an opinion publicly (Yetkin 2004;
Bölükbaşı 2008).
The AKP leader Erdoğan was conﬂicted about the decision. Although he was
sensitive to the overwhelming public opposition and the reservations within his own
party, he felt that the newly elected Islamic-associated government could not risk
going against the United States, Turkey’s most important long-standing ally. ‘In the
end, Erdoğan chose the middle ground and gave the impression that he did not
strongly support either option. He asked the government to move with negotiations
and preparations for the war, but in public, he did not strongly support the motion’
(Taydaş and Özdamar 2013: 235).
Erdoğan and Gül decided to send a motion to the parliament. The motion asked the
parliament to allow 62,000 US troops (also 255 warplanes and 65 helicopters) to be
stationed in Turkey as well as to grant the right for Turkey to deploy 40,000 troops in
coordination with the United States in Northern Iraq (Robins 2003a). The parliament
voted on the motion on 1 March, 2003, only to reject it. Although the motion gained a
numeric majority (264 to 250), it failed to receive the simple majority of all legislators
because of 19 abstentions. By all accounts, the party leadership was surprised at the
outcome (Yetkin 2003; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Taydaş and Özdamar 2013).
Opening of Turkish air space
On 14 March, 2003, ﬁve days after winning a by-election, Erdoğan became prime
minister. Even before the changes in the cabinet, the AKP leadership had agreed to
present a new motion to the parliament and pursue it with great vigour when the right
time came (Robins 2003a). The argument this time was that the new bill should not
commit Turkey directly to participate in the Iraq war, but allow the United States to
use its bases in Turkey.
The new motion was sent to the parliament for a March 20 vote, as Article 92
required. Unlike the March 1 motion, two leaders were more proactive on this
occasion: chief of staff Hilmi Özkök and the AKP leader and new prime minister
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Erdoğan. Özkök declared publicly that the military supported the government’s
position (Yetkin 2004: 186). According to the military, Turkey should not be left
completely outside of the events in Iraq and it should have a say in re-shaping the
new Iraq. For Özkök, by just wishing the war did not happen and doing nothing,
Turkey would be hurt (Balbay 2004). Such a clear and strong declaration by the
military was inﬂuential in the second decision.
Erdoğan also took important extra measures before the parliamentary vote.
Tellingly, he did not reappoint Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, who eventually voted against
the bill, to the new cabinet (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010). Moreover, there were
several ‘closed-door’ meetings that Erdoğan held with the AKP deputies before
the vote. The bill was approved on 20 March, following a 332 to 202 vote and one
abstention. This result gave the government the power to grant the United States
over-ﬂight rights to conduct bombing missions and to send special forces to
Northern Iraq to engage Iraqi forces.
Structural factors in the 1991 and 2003 Iraq war decisions
On these occasions for decisions, structural constraints were either very similar or
indeterminate. For both cases, Turkey’s most important strategic ally, the United
States, offered rewards and put pressure on Turkey to secure Turkish cooperation in
the military conﬂicts. The threat of a destabilised Iraq and what that would mean for
Kurdish aspirations for independence and for refugees into Turkey were also
operative in both cases and decision makers had to decide if it was better to be
involved and have some post-conﬂict inﬂuence on Iraq, even if they opposed the
invasions. The economic costs on Turkey of a war, despite promises of off-setting aid
from the United States, were additional constraints that Turkish leaders had to
consider in 1991 and 2003.
Certainly, the international structure differed in other ways across these time
periods. In 1991, the Cold War had only just ended. The Soviet Union still existed, it
was an ally of Iraq, and was an important factor in the US and the UN decision
making. In 2003, the bipolar international structure had clearly given way to the
military hegemon, the United States. Arguably, Turkey was more constrained by
the international structures in 1991. As a middle power, it was clearly dependent on
the United States during the Cold War. By 2003, Turkey had successfully charted a
more independent foreign policy and there was greater division within the inter-
national community over the second Iraq war. These clear differences in the
international system, however, did not have automatic consequences. Not all Turkish
leaders in 1991 believed that there was nothing Turkey could do but support the
United States. Even the military was willing to defy the ally’s pressure. And it would
be difﬁcult to argue that Özal was simply acting as a pawn of the United States or that
he succumbed to the US pressure against his will. Similarly, in 2003, not all thought
that Turkey was ‘free’ to ignore the request of the United States. Indeed, Erdoğan
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believed it was necessary to support the United States, for Turkey’s interests. Thus,
the differences in international structures cannot account for the different outcomes
and processes of these cases.
Internal structures were very similar across the cases. In the ﬁrst Iraq war
decisions, the Motherland Party was a single party government, controlling a
majority of votes in the parliament and all cabinet positions. The cabinet was formed
after Özal had left the leadership of the Motherland Party following his election to
presidency. Similarly, in the second Iraq war decisions, the cabinet was composed
entirely of the AKP deputies and this single party commanded a parliamentary
majority. In both cases, there were divisions within the ruling parties: in 1991, some
Motherland Party members, led by Mesut Yılmaz, blamed president Özal for reckless
foreign policy behaviour, and in 2003, Bülent Arınç, the speaker of the parliament,
and Yalçınbayır, deputy prime minister, opposed the war in general and the US
requests from Turkey. In both cases, key bureaucratic and military actors were either
pushing for their own policy preference or remained strategically silent. Another
important structural constant were the constitutional constraints that were identical
across these occasions. Article 92 of the constitution did not allow decisions to be
made by the cabinet or by a single leader, and gave the power to the parliament to
decide on war powers.
Despite these constraints, Özal did not refrain from pressuring the prime minister
and the cabinet or from using his personal inﬂuence on certain deputies in the
parliament to get a decision to his liking in the ﬁrst Iraq war. Once the parliament
granted the cabinet war powers, Özal conducted all negotiations with the US
authorities, shadowing the government. On both occasions for decision, Özal
sidelined the traditional policymakers like the military and the ministry of foreign
affairs and replaced representatives from these actors with his own advisors and
supporters. Unlike previous presidents, Özal went further by interpreting Article 104
of the constitution to its fullest in a way to use the maximum authority given to
the president (Kılıç 1990). He was quick to note that, as president, he was the chief of
the army, and head of the MGK, and therefore empowered with the mandate of the
parliament to authorise Turkish troops when the parliament was in recess. With this,
he almost saw himself equal to the prime minister and the cabinet and he acted as if
Turkey had a presidential system. In doing so, Özal challenged considerable
domestic constraints to secure his preferred outcome in the 1991 Gulf War.
The decision-making process on the ﬁrst occasion for decision of the second Iraq
war was also very complex and involved multiple actors; actions required parlia-
mentary approval but the leadership of the AKP was divided. Erdoğan did not have
any ofﬁcial position in the government at the time, but he was nevertheless
effectively in charge of the party. Furthermore, Gül did not act as a predominant
leader, instead trying to spread the responsibility for the decision. It is telling that the
AKP leader Erdoğan did not push hard for approval of the motion either. He held a
group meeting on 25 and 26 February, in which he asked party members to vote in
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favour of the bill. He later asked the AKP deputies to write down their preferences on
a piece of paper. The results suggested that the majority of the deputies would be
voting for the motion, and that the motion would be passed by more than enough
votes (Taydaş and Özdamar 2013: 236). This might explain why Erdoğan refrained
from taking a group decision at this meeting, which would have required the AKP to
vote en bloc on 1 March. The decision was left entirely to the parliament. In this
sense, this particular occasion was completely different from the 1991 decision in
which Özal displayed a forceful leadership challenging constraints at the risk of
creating a domestic political crisis.
As the case studies illustrate, despite similarities in structural factors, the decisions
reached in the ﬁrst and second Iraq war decisions were signiﬁcantly different from
each other. Turkey largely complied with the United States in 1991, while it did so
only moderately and belatedly in 2003. These differences cannot be traced easily to
different structural pressures or opportunities. Furthermore, both agents who were
key in these decisions— Özal and Erdoğan— favoured cooperation with the United
States. What is different is how they interacted with the various structures they faced.
In what follows below, we examine the personality traits of Turgut Özal and Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan to help us understand better how these two leaders reacted to internal
and external constraints.
Adding agents’ orientations to structures: Özal and Erdoğan’s
leadership trait analysis
Table 1 shows scores for Özal and Erdoğan on each of the seven personality traits, as
well as the mean scores for the comparison groups composed of world leaders and a
smaller set of Middle Eastern leaders. Özal and Erdoğan have very similar scores for
belief in ability to control events, in-group bias, distrust of others, and task focus. The
traits for which the two leaders differ are conceptual complexity, need for power, and
self-conﬁdence. In this section, we focus on the differences in the leaders’ traits and
explore how they contribute to our understanding of the case studies and the
dissimilar processes and outcomes in the foreign policies of these leaders. Due to
space considerations, we make reference to the world leaders comparison group;
comparisons using the Middle East norming group are almost identical with no
signiﬁcant change in our interpretation of the differences between Özal and Erdoğan.
Our aim is to use the LTA traits to provide a reliable, systematic assessment for an
understanding of which characteristics of agents affect their interactions with
structures and how. Our purpose here is also to evaluate critically the speciﬁc traits
of LTA for their ability to explain leadership behaviour.
Özal scores higher than Erdoğan (almost one standard deviation above him) on the
self-conﬁdence trait. Erdoğan’s score (0.36) equals the mean for the world leaders
comparison group; Özal (0.45) is almost one standard deviation higher than the world
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mean. Leaders with high self-conﬁdence have an elevated sense of self-importance
and ‘are more immune to incoming information from the environment than those
with low self-conﬁdence. They are generally satisﬁed with who they are and are not
searching for more material on which to evaluate themselves and their behaviour’
(Hermann 2003: 195). Leaders with low self-conﬁdence, on the other hand,
are easily buffeted by the ‘contextual winds’. Without a well-developed sense of
who they are, such leaders tend to continually seek out information from the
environment in order to know what to do and how to conﬁrm to the demands of
the circumstances in which they ﬁnd themselves. […] To compensate for feelings
of inadequacy, these leaders seek to become the agents […] that can help to
enhance their self-conﬁdence. (Hermann 2003: 196)
The difference in Özal and Erdoğan’s self-conﬁdence, as measured at the particular
time of these decisions, can help explain their dissimilar leadership styles in the
cases. Özal’s higher self-conﬁdence enabled him to challenge and manipulate
domestic constraints, including constitutional limitations on his authority. He also
did not hesitate to use his inﬂuence directly or indirectly. Sanctions against Iraq were
solely and promptly decided by Özal despite the wait-and-see policy of the other
actors. He pursued his interests and realised his policy preferences by ensuring the
transfer of power to himself, being in direct contact with president Bush, assuming
the lead negotiator role, and obtaining legislation that would also give him a lot of
leeway in negotiations with the United States. He used his power bluntly and
excluded many people from the process to achieve his desired policy outcome. Özal
was dismissive towards those who stood in his way, sidelining or eliminating them in
the decision-making process. Excluding the ministry of foreign affairs bureaucrats
from decision making, he created a domestic political crisis that led to three
resignations. Özal’s self-conﬁdence can be seen in his ﬁrm belief in the ‘right thing
Table 1 LTA Proﬁle of Özal and Erdoğan on seven personality traitsa
Personality trait Özal Erdoğan World mean [N= 284]
(standard deviation)
Middle East mean [N= 46]
(standard deviation)
Belief in ability to
control events
0.35 0.37 0.35 (0.05) 0.33 (0.06)
Conceptual
complexity
0.66 0.58 0.59 (0.06) 0.56 (0.08)
Distrust of others 0.09 0.11 0.13 (0.06) 0.16 (0.07)
In-group bias 0.10 0.10 0.15 (0.05) 0.15 (0.06)
Need for power 0.22 0.31 0.26 (0.05) 0.27 (0.06)
Self-conﬁdence 0.45 0.36 0.36 (0.10) 0.31 (0.13)
Task focus 0.70 0.73 0.63 (0.07) 0.58 (0.06)
aWorld and Middle East means and standard deviation numbers obtained from Margaret Hermann (email
communication). These were calculated from the data created by the ProﬁlerPlus program (version 5.8.4).
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that needed to be done’, which was to join the US-led coalition and get Iraq out of
Kuwait, and in his adamant pursuit of this policy even at the expense of domestic
political relations.
Erdoğan, on the other hand, did not have the high conﬁdence to direct the process
at the time. Instead, he let the process unfold itself in the beginning. Unlike Özal,
he delegated decision making and negotiations to Gül and Yakış, other people
from his party, as well as bureaucrats. Even when he advised the AKP deputies in
late February to vote for the US troops deployment in Turkey, Erdoğan did not
take a group decision or display a forceful leadership. Similarly, whereas he took
charge of the process and acted more decisively and forcefully on the second
occasion for decision, he still took into account advice given by other people in the
policy-making circles.
Özal and Erdoğan also differ in conceptual complexity. Özal has a higher score
(0.66) than Erdoğan (0.58) and is one standard deviation above the mean for the
world leaders group, while Erdoğan is one standard deviation below Özal and has
almost the same score as the world leaders mean. Conceptual complexity indicates
the ability of the leader to differentiate, describe, or discuss other people, places,
policies, or ideas in a complex manner. Leaders that have high conceptual complex-
ity see various dimensions of an issue, are more comfortable with uncertainty, and
are ﬂexible in their reactions to ideas. Such leaders seek a variety of perspectives and
are attuned to contextual information. Leaders who have low conceptual complexity
tend to see positions as black-and-white, are unaware of ambiguity in their
environment, and are inﬂexible in their reactions to ideas. Such leaders often act
based on their intuition and prefer action to analysis, planning, or an extensive search
for information (Hermann 2003).
The differences in complexity between Özal and Erdoğan can be interpreted
meaningfully in the cases. Özal’s higher complexity may have given him the ability,
not just the motivation, to carefully engineer and dominate the decision making.
Consistent with conceptually complex leaders, Özal was in constant communication
with foreign leaders and he closely monitored the developments in the crisis by
seeking ﬁrst-hand information from his foreign counterparts, especially the US
president Bush. Among Turkish leaders, Özal was one of the few who talked with a
wide variety of foreign correspondents and journalists on a variety of related topics,
such as with experts from OPEC and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation on the
effects of crisis for the global oil market. He often explained Turkey’s position during
the crisis and asked how they saw the events. In his speeches on the crisis, Özal often
relied on and disclosed facts about the crisis (e.g. oil prices, new power balance,
alliances, trade relations, threat perception) and how other countries in the world, and
especially Turkey’s Western allies, positioned themselves. He often used factual data
to convince the opposition. Erdoğan, on the other hand, was not very successful in
manipulating the environment and getting the result he desired, especially on the ﬁrst
occasion for decision. He was also not seeking information actively, especially from
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sources outside of Turkey. Inside the country, he was surprised at the outcome of the
parliamentary vote.
The third trait on which Özal and Erdoğan differ is need for power. Özal (0.22) is
almost one standard deviation lower than the mean of the comparison group; but
Erdoğan’s score (0.31) is both above the world leaders average and almost two
standard deviations higher than Özal’s. According to Hermann (2003), leaders with a
high need for power have a strong desire to control or inﬂuence others:
They are good at sizing up situations and sensing what tactics will work to achieve
their goals. Indeed, they are highly Machiavellian, often working behind the
scenes to insure their positions prevail. […] Leaders high in need for power will
test the limits before adhering to a course of action, bartering and bargaining up
until the last moment to see what is possible […]. (ibid., 191).
Leaders who are low in power, on the other hand, are comfortable allowing others to
lead and have inﬂuence. They put the group’s interest before their own and they
empower others around them to share responsibility.
Özal’s and Erdoğan’s scores on this trait do not resonate well in the case studies.
Instead, Özal acts much more like a leader with a high need for power, skilfully
manipulating the policy-making process, driven by his desire to inﬂuence the decisions.
Erdoğan, on the other hand does not behave much like a leader with a high need for
power. Although he does take greater responsibility and seeks to inﬂuence the outcome
in the second decision, overall, he does not appear Machiavellian.
Despite the importance of the other LTA traits in previous research on leaders’
personalities and foreign policy, this study ﬁnds no critical differences between Özal
and Erdoğan in terms of their belief in ability to control events (both are around the
world leaders mean), distrust (both are close to the mean of the world leaders), in-
group bias (both are one standard deviation below the mean), and task focus (both are
one standard deviation higher than the world leaders mean).
Two of the traits that differ between Özal and Erdoğan, self-conﬁdence and
conceptual complexity, do help explain these leaders’ dissimilar interactions with
their structural context in theoretically meaningful ways. This suggests that these
traits, and their combinations, deserve more attention in future research. Furthermore,
conceptual complexity may relate to leaders’ abilities to manipulate constraints as
much as it relates to leaders’ openness to a variety of perspectives. Finally, Erdoğan’s
proﬁle may be sensitive to this particular time period, reﬂecting his high need for
power at the time as he learns to control others around him. The time period
considered for this study is a peculiar one as he was just elected to a national political
ofﬁce and right after his domestic political ban on him. This is consistent with
personality theory that stresses the interaction between the agent and the context: as
the context changes, individuals may adapt to new situations within certain
parameters of their personality traits. Some leaders, however, such as Erdoğan, are
much more likely to be sensitive to contextual changes and learning opportunities
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than others (Hermann 2003). Speciﬁcally, we would also predict that his self-
conﬁdence would increase over his tenure in ofﬁce. As a result, he would become
more dominant in the decision-making process over time.
Indeed, a key difference between Özal and Erdoğan is their levels of experience.
Özal was a much more seasoned politician during the decision making for the ﬁrst
Iraq war; Erdoğan was only just coming to power in a national ofﬁce during the
decision making for the second Iraq war. Erdoğan’s lower scores for self-conﬁdence
and complexity and his higher need for power may be related to his lack of
experience at this time. This does not mean, however, that Erdoğan’s personality
proﬁle is merely a reﬂection of his new role— leaders’ personalities do change over
time (Renshon 2008), especially for leaders more sensitive to their environments
(Hermann 2003). Furthermore, not all new leaders are low in self-conﬁdence and
complexity and high in need for power— leaders vary in terms of how they respond
to experience. Finally, other research suggests that experience may not always
matter. Dyson and Preston (2006) ﬁnd that leaders are not more likely to base
analogies in their own experiences, but experienced and inexperienced leaders both
refer to generally available knowledge. They claim that ‘the availability of an
analogy is impacted less by the event being personally experienced than was
previously thought’ (ibid.: 283). Likewise, Hermann et al. (2001: 100) note that
leaders may challenge constraints in domestic or international policy both when they
are experienced and when they have little experience.
Hermann (1980) has suggested that experience acts as an intervening variable.
Leaders with more experience may rely on their background and thus their
personalities and predispositions matter less than those of leaders who are new to
the position. We do not see this dynamic in the case studies. While Erdoğan’s lack of
experience may be reﬂected in his traits at the time, Özal’s traits do not seem to be
mufﬂed by his experience. Quite the contrary, Özal’s considerable experience seems
to interact with his predispositions as he skilfully manipulated the process and
challenged constraints.
To unpack further the effects of the different levels of experience for these two
leaders, we examined the leaders’ personality characteristics at alternative points in
their career. When we compare ‘Özal the inexperienced’ (with data from the 1980s
till his presidency in 1989) with ‘Özal at the time of the Iraq case’, we ﬁnd little
difference in the key traits of conceptual complexity and self-conﬁdence.9 When we
compare ‘Erdoğan the experienced’ (with data from August 2007 to June 2013) with
‘Erdoğan at the time of the Iraq case’, we also ﬁnd little difference (and no
statistically signiﬁcant difference) in the key traits of conceptual complexity and
self-conﬁdence.10 The differences in these two leaders’ levels of experience,
although important, cannot account easily for their different styles in the Iraq cases.
Moreover, just comparing the differences in these leaders’ levels of experience would
tell us little about how experience matters. LTA allows us to focus on how experience
might be evident (by identifying need for power, complexity, and conﬁdence) and the
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case studies reveal how these differences inﬂuenced the process and outcome of these
decisions.
Conclusions
According to a prominent volume on operational code research (Schafer and Walker
2006), it is the intersection of agent and structure that foreign policy researchers should
focus on, for future work here will yield the most returns. Other theories support this
idea, but few authors address directly the orientation of agents to structural constraints
and most of our understanding of security policy privileges decidedly the structural
explanations in systemic, institutional and cultural forms. This study engaged this topic
directly by examining how leaders interact with their institutional, political and
situational contexts and by tracing the effects of leaders’ personalities.
Despite similar or indeterminate structural constraints, Turkey’s 1991 and 2003 Iraq
war decisions differed signiﬁcantly in terms of process and outcome. We argue that the
difference in the outcomes cannot be explained by structural constraints alone. By
means of process-tracing, we demonstrated variation in leaders’ orientations to and
interactions with structures. Working under very similar contextual constraints, Özal
and Erdoğan used different tactics and strategies. For example, whereas Özal managed
to dictate his preferences and utilised effectively his leverage over the prime minister
and the cabinet, Erdoğan allowed the process to unfold and, in the end, was not always
able to secure his preferred outcome. Indeed, Erdoğan was pushed and pulled by the
different preferences of the United States, the military, and his own party.
The differences in Özal’s and Erdoğan’s self-conﬁdence and conceptual complex-
ity, we conclude, underpin their approaches in these cases. The content analytic LTA
framework provides a valuable tool for specifying the characteristics of agents and
how they relate to their contexts. The combination of LTA with structured-focused
and process-tracing comparative case studies is an especially fruitful approach to
study the nuanced agency — structure interaction. Overall, the differences in how
these leaders interacted with their decision-making environments and the dissimilar
decision outcomes in similar situations support the view that a given structure may be
interpreted and acted upon differently by leaders who may have different styles and
traits and that leaders are not equally constrained or empowered by constraints.
Our examination of Özal and Erdoğan is an important contribution as it adds
theoretically to the study of leaders and international politics and empirically to our
understanding of Turkish leaders and Turkish foreign policy. The choices of Turkey,
as a strategic ally to the United States, as a member of NATO, and as an increasingly
important economic and regional power, can have a major impact in international
politics. Although they often have to coordinate policy choices with the military,
coalition partners, and international actors, Turkish prime ministers and presidents
have considerable inﬂuence in foreign policy decision making. How they see the
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world, how they choose to react to challenges, and what informs their preferences are
signiﬁcant to an understanding of Turkish foreign policy. Scholars of Turkish foreign
policy are not alone in continuing to privilege structural factors over agents; leaders
characteristics are under-theorised and rarely investigated in general international
relations research. Yet, a complete understanding of international politics and
decision-making processes and outcomes requires serious theoretical and empirical
attention to how characteristics of agents shape leaders’ orientations to systemic,
institutional, and situational constraints. LTA and other approaches to political
personalities (e.g. operational code research and cognitive mapping) offer conceptual
grounding and reliable methods for capturing this relationship.
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Notes
1 For more on the importance of prime ministers and presidents in Turkish foreign policy, see Özcan
(2008), Robins (2003b) and Hale (2002).
2 SSA is headed by Michael R. Young; Margaret Hermann was a co-founder in 1997. In ProﬁlerPlus,
SSA converted Hermann’s Leadership Traits Analysis and Steven Walker’s Operational Code
Analysis hand-coding practices into automated coding (www.socialscience.net).
3 See Hermann (2003) on how scores are calculated on each personality trait.
4 Erdoğan’s word count is lower because he did not have an ofﬁcial role in decision-making processes.
This limited his public, spontaneous statements on Iraq. However, by all accounts (including
interviews of several high-level policymakers from this case), Erdoğan was actively involved in
decision making, especially concerning the decisions that were very critical for the negotiations and
the case.
5 For discussions and examinations of these issues, see Dille and Young (2000), Marﬂeet (2000),
Schafer (2000), Schafer and Crichlow (2000), Schafer and Walker (2006), Renshon (2008), Renshon
(2009), and Schafer and Crichlow (2010).
6 According to Mehmet Keçeciler, this decision had to be taken in any case because of the UN
Resolution. Indeed, the next week the US secretary of state James Baker was visiting Turkey. The
decision was announced right before Baker’s visit enhanced Turkey’s negotiating position vis-à-vis
the United States as the latter saw this as an important gesture in their partnership (authors’ interview
with minister Mehmet Keçeciler, July 2013).
7 In 1998, after reciting a poem that allegedly incited religious hatred, Erdoğan was imprisoned and
banned from running for political ofﬁce.
8 Authors’ interview with Yaşar Yakış, August 2013.
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9 The t-test score for conceptual complexity for Özal was t(71)= 0.784 (not signiﬁcant) and for self-
conﬁdence t(70)= 0.377 (not signiﬁcant). No other trait had a statistically signiﬁcant difference across
the time periods for Özal.
10 The t-test score for conceptual complexity for Erdoğan was t(120)= 0.508 (not signiﬁcant) and for
conﬁdence it was t(114)= 0.532 (not signiﬁcant). The only trait that was statistically signiﬁcantly
different across time was task orientation, indicating that Erdoğan became less problem-focused
during his second term with t(121)=−3.35 (p<0.005).
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